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The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the following website: http://www.bde.es. The objective of this paper is to develop a methodology for the analysis of capital requirements under Basel II that will allow us to focus on the procyclicality issue, and to assess with real data the impact of various ways to compute probabilities of default (e.g. point-in-time, through-the-cycle, averages along the cycle, corrected for the cycle, etc.). One of the most important conclusions that different supervisors and regulators have observed in analysing simulated Basel II capital requirements is that there is a wide dispersion among credit institutions that does not correspond with identifiable differences in risk. In fact, the various methods or even the different alternatives that banks use to estimate their key credit risk parameters (i.e. the probability of default), are to some extent responsible for the wide variability and uncertainty surrounding the internal ratings-based approach (IRB) proposed by the BCBS to calculate regulatory capital. and high variability among credit institutions' requirements may take place as a result of Basel II. Consequently, the aim of this paper is general and it may be used to assess corporate and retail portfolios. However, here we focus on one of the most under researched areas regarding Basel II, which is the potential procyclicality of mortgage portfolios. This lack of research may be a consequence of the lack of data even though mortgages are, for retail banks and many internationally active banks, one of their largest portfolios. Moreover, the cyclicality of the mortgage portfolio is also interesting because the largest contribution to the reduction in IRB minimum regulatory capital, according to the latest quantitative studies, comes from this specific portfolio [see BCBS (2006a) ].
First, we develop a classification system which encompasses a model that estimates a probability of default for each obligor: that is, there is a model which assigns an . It includes information on almost the whole population of mortgages granted by all Spanish credit institutions.
Therefore, we can perform a global analysis for the whole banking system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the procyclicality discussion under Basel II and the literature on mortgage capital regulation.
Section 3 presents the PD estimation methodology employed in this paper and the database which supports it. Section 4 shows the results in terms of distributions of PDs along time.
Section 5 focuses on capital requirements using as input to calculate them the PDs obtained in the previous section. Finally, Section 6 provides a conclusion. (1)
The endogenous variable is a dichotomous (zero-one) variable which takes value 1 if a borrower defaults in year t, 0 otherwise. It has to be clearly stated that the estimated PDs are a measure of the likelihood that an obligor will default within a certain assessment horizon.
This horizon is fixed at a one-year period. Under this premise, the endogenous variable is constructed, also assuming that a defaulted obligor is defined in a similar way as in Basel II 9 : at least 90 days overdue, failing to meet financial obligations on a certain loan. If a borrower has several mortgages, failure to meet payments on any of them means that this borrower is in default. Based on that, we estimate a logistic transformation of equation (1) by the standard maximum likelihood maximization process.
Among the explanatory variables, RISKBORRit is a vector of risk profile characteristics of each borrower evaluated at time t. In particular, we use DEFHISTit as a variable which informs whether a certain borrower has defaulted in any period previous to the one used to fix the one-year assessment period for which the PD is calculated (i.e. possible failure in t-2, t-3...). Additionally, this variable is weighted by the distance in time since the default of that obligor took place. Thus, the more distant in time the default took place, the less it counts, which seems in line with banks' credit policy practices in general.
OVERHISTit is another risk profile variable which accounts for the possibility that a borrower has been delinquent in previous periods (t-1, t-2...). That is, OVERHISTit represents borrowers overdue on their loans who finally meet their financial obligations before the 90-day threshold, that is, before becoming officially defaulted. As for the previous variable, this one is also weighted by the distance in time a borrower committed delinquency on his loan. It has to be noted that many of the problems that are behind an overdue loan are "technical" ones, spanning only a few days as a result of mistakes or lack of monitoring of balances, accidental cash shortage, holidays, etc. Nevertheless, we include this risk profile variable since a risk averse borrower will always hold a minimum buffer for unexpected events to avoid, precisely, becoming overdue.
We also include as an explanatory variable the rate of change in the latter variable (CHANOVERHISTit). Its inclusion intends to anticipate future declines in borrowers' ability to repay their mortgages. Finally, the variable AGEit measures the age of each loan which usually coincides with the number of years each borrower has been in the Credit Register, that is, it represents his age as a borrower. As will be shown later, there is a particular relationship between the age of a loan and its probability of default, showing that, in general, higher rates of default take place during the first years of a mortgage. After that period of time (three to four years), the rate of default decreases progressively with the age of the loan 10 .
We also include in equation (1) a vector of variables that proxy for the liquidity constraints that a borrower may face (LIQBORRit). Variable UTILit is the quotient between the amount of credit drawn by a borrower and the total available amount (credit line).
Some mortgages are sold as a credit line facility where the borrower can withdraw money at any time against the amount already repaid. The collateral (i.e. the house that constitutes the object of the mortgage) remains pledged to the credit line. The more a borrower withdraws, the more liquidity constrained he may be. The second liquidity variable is NUMBANKSit, the number of banks with which the borrower has lending relationships. Note that we focus on individual borrowers, not banks. As a result, we hypothesize that the higher the number of banks a borrower is related to, the more constrained he is in terms of liquidity.
The above-mentioned risk profile and liquidity variables are only a subset of those we have used. Apart from levels or first differences, we have tried continuous and discrete specifications. Given that many of these variables are highly correlated, we previously ran univariate regressions (borrower mortgage default as a function of a variable at a time). From those regressions we took the variables with the highest explanatory power. Later on, we ran equation (1) using combinations of the selected variables. Based on forecasting capacity 11 , the main guide for banks when they develop their scoring/rating systems, we finally determined the set of variables included in the final multivariate regression.
Note that banks, in developing their internal models for mortgage defaults, have much more detailed information on each borrower (basically, income and social information).
We are hypothesizing here that the past experience of a borrower, both in terms of overdue and defaulted loans, as well as the age in the Credit Register, are a sufficient statistic for that information. Thus, the main difference between our benchmark model and those of banks lies in the accuracy of default forecasts (i.e. the percentage of defaulted and non-defaulted borrowers properly classified as such). Note that this is less relevant in our paper since we focus on the behaviour of PDs along the cycle and the different ways they are calculated, as well as the dispersion they may create in determining regulatory capital. There is no reason to think that our sufficient statistic performs differently in upturns and downturns.
Our cyclical variable in model (1) is the real GDP growth rate (GDPGt). Among the CONTROL variables, we have included a dummy that accounts for the region of the borrower. We also control for the type of mortgage lender: commercial bank, savings bank, credit cooperative or credit finance establishments. Savings banks (not-for-profit banks) hold half of the market share in mortgages. Moreover, the risk profile may change according to the ownership structure of the bank [Delgado, Salas and Saurina (2006) ]. We also include a dummy variable (REG99) that takes the value of 1 from 1999 onwards and 0 otherwise, in order to reflect the change in the report of defaulted loans in the database. After 1999, any defaulted amount is reported while before that year only defaults above 6,000 euros were reported. The expected sign of the dummy variable is positive.
10.
A similar behaviour, an inverted U-shaped curve between the age of a loan and its probability of default, is found on credit card delinquencies by Gross and Souleles (2002) . 11. This predicting capacity has to be understood in terms of accurate classification of defaulted and non-defaulted borrowers.
Database
The database used for this study is the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain (CIR). The CIR records monthly information on all credit operations granted by credit institutions (commercial banks, savings banks, credit cooperatives and specialised credit institutions) in Spain for a value of over €6,000. The CIR's data structure distinguishes between credits given to firms and those to individuals 12 . The CIR includes information on the characteristics of each loan, including the following: instrument (trade credit, financial credit, leasing, etc.), currency denomination, maturity, existence or not of guarantees or collateral, type of guarantor (government or credit institution), the coverage of the guarantee, the amount drawn and undrawn of a credit commitment and, finally, but very importantly, whether the loan is current in payment or past due (distinguishing between delinquency and default status).
The CIR also includes information relating to the characteristics of borrowers: province of residence and, for firms, the industry in which they operate. There is no information regarding the interest rate of the loan.
Here, we focus on mortgages to individuals. These are collateralized loans with maturity over five years. The time period covered goes from 1990 to 2004, which covers a whole business cycle in Spain, with a deep recession around 1993 and the corresponding upturn, even boom, during the nineties and the first years of the current decade. Given the very low threshold for a loan to be included within the CIR, we can be confident of having information about the entire population of mortgages in Spain. That means dealing with a vast amount of information (over 30 million loans) which makes it almost impossible to run any regression. Accordingly, we have cut down the population into another tractable one by choosing only a certain number of borrowers. A sampling procedure was carried out based on a very simple rule that produced a stratified sample that perfectly matches with the main characteristics of the entire population. After sampling the population of loans we are still left with almost 3 million mortgages. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any paper that uses such an amount of information for modelling default probabilities of mortgages. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the whole population of mortgages as well as those of the sample chosen. Note that even though the default ratios (proportion of defaulted borrowers) may sometimes be quite low (below 1%), given the amount of observations we have, this is not a problem for the estimation of model (1) .
It can also be seen that the number of borrowers as well as the amount lent increases significantly along time, while the increase in the average size of the loan less than doubles. The problem loan ratio as well as the proportion of defaults (i.e. rough PD calculations from the population and the sample) follows a cyclical pattern reaching a maximum around 1993 (the recession year). The extremely low current levels show the strength of the business cycle in Spain and/or the change in banks´ credit risk policies.
From Table 1 we can conclude that there is an almost perfect matching between the main characteristics of the whole population and the sample we have taken from it. Table 2a , column 1, shows the results of the estimation of model (1) . All the variables have the expected signs and are significant at the 99% level. The higher the risk profile of a borrower 12. There is a clear separation between the characteristics of loans to companies (mainly in terms of the size of the loan, maturity, collateral and default rates) and those loans granted to individuals, making it appropriate to treat each of the two groups separately. the higher the probability of default. Consequently, overdue loans (OVERHISTit and CHANOVERHISTit) can be considered as a signal of future default (both in levels and rates of growth). Regarding other variables, the older a loan, the lower its probability of default 13 (negative sign of the age variable). Taking into account liquidity issues, the higher the use of bank funds and the more lenders an individual resorts to, the higher the probability of default (positive sign for UTILit and NUMBANKSit). Thus, liquidity constraints also seem to play a role in mortgage defaults.
Results
Commercial banks (omitted dummy variable of ownership type) are the least risky regarding mortgages, whereas credit finance establishments show the highest PD (not shown in the Table) . The latter credit institutions hold a small market share (around 1%) but they concentrate on riskier borrowers, maybe those who cannot obtain a mortgage from deposit institutions.
The sign of the cyclical variable included in the regression, GDP growth rate, is negative and significant, as expected. During downturns and recessions, mortgage defaults increase, declining in upturns. Therefore, PDs fluctuate along the cycle. In the next section we analyse how much they may vary depending on the way they are calculated. The borrowers' classification system is used as the basis for obtaining the different estimates of the PDs.
The second through fourth columns of Table 2a show that the former results are robust, both in terms of sign and significance, to changes in control variables. Column 2 shows the results of the regression when the type-of-lender dummies have been taken out.
Column 3 excludes regional dummies and, finally, column 4 excludes both sets of dummies.
In addition, we have performed several robustness analyses on the results presented in Table 2a (not shown to save space). We also included an interest rate variable (both nominal and real). It is positive and significant in both cases but the accuracy of the model does not improve significantly. We have also excluded GDPG and included the interest rate with very similar quantitative results. We could probably have included other business cycle variables but, we might have lost clarity in modelling changes that take into account cyclical variables. This is why we stick only to the GDPG for the measurement of The first PD obtained is the easiest to calculate (the point-in-time, PIT, PD). We can use the actual PD (that is, the ratio between the number of mortgage borrowers that default in year t, not having defaulted in the previous period, over the total number of borrowers with a mortgage) or the estimated (fitted) one using the regression model and the predictions extracted from it. Given the two available options, we choose the first one in order to use the most accurate possible information. In any case, the sample average PDs in both approaches are, as expected, very similar (1.1% real and 1.2% fitted) as well as their shape along time. The second type of PD derived from the estimated classification system is the through-the-cycle one (TTC). According to Heitfield (2005) , that PD is the one that would occur at the trough of the business cycle. This means that we have to use the value that the GDP growth rate took in year 1993, the most negative year in the sample, to calculate it. In fact, that year represents the worst recession that the Spanish economy has experienced in the last 40 years. Thus, to compute the PD we keep constant the GDPGt variable at the 1993 level while allowing for changes in the other significant variables included in model (1) 15 . Consequently, we obtain different individual TTC PDs as well as the overall one for each year. Table 3 , second column, shows, as expected, that the average PD TTC is almost 80% higher than the PIT PD. However, taking into account how both PDs have been calculated, the profile along time of the TTC PD is much smoother than that of the PIT one.
The third column in Table 3 contains another smoothing type of PD (a long-run average PD). This is a cumulative average, where the PD attributed to each year is the simple average of the yearly averages of the fitted PDs up to that year. As can be observed, the sample average is not too far away from the sample average of the TTC PD. This result is mainly obtained by construction since we start with high levels of PDs that remain along the cycle, thus influencing the long-run average. A partial answer to this problem is to use a rolling (moving) average, with the drawback of not including in the average the first years of the sample that, in our case, constitute those of the recession. It should be noted that for the 15. The fitted PD is obtained by substituting in model (1) the value that each explanatory variable takes, keeping the value of GDPG fixed at the 1993 level.
rolling average PD volatility declines relative to PIT estimates the longer is the lag length applied.
The last two columns in Table 3 show different variations of how a rating system may be used to calculate PDs. These represent different cyclical corrections in the values of the fitted PDs. Particularly, the fourth column of Table 3 presents PD estimates determined when the value of the GDP growth rate variable in model (1) is substituted by its average during the entire sample period (cyclically corrected PD) 16 . Volatility, measured by the standard deviation, declines dramatically in comparison with PIT or even TTC estimates.
However, the sample average PD across the period is very close to that of the PIT PD.
The coefficient of variation, that is, the dispersion measure that controls for the level of the mean, shows roughly similar dispersion for the TTC PDs and the cyclically corrected ones, while the levels are much higher for the former than for the latter.
The last column of Table 3 shows what we could call an acyclical PD. This is calculated using a rating based on the prediction model (1) but excluding the cycle variable (GDPGt). That is, we reestimate model (1) without the cyclical variable and, subsequently, predict individual PDs in the absence of the common factor 17 . The results are almost identical if we exclude regional dummies (not shown). The sample average acyclical PD is very similar to the PIT one since we have smoothed away the large PDs during the recession. Nevertheless, the variability across PDs is higher for the PIT as a result of the relatively high values recorded in the early nineties. Accordingly, the volatility of the acyclical PDs is very low compared to that of the PIT one and, to some extent when compared to the volatility of the TTC PD. Figure 1 shows the outcome of the five different ways of calculating PD from the estimated rating system. There are significant differences across the various approaches that produce significantly distinct Basel II capital requirements for mortgages. In the next section we analyse these requirements.
16. The cyclically corrected PD is obtained by substituting in model (1) the value that each explanatory variable takes in each year, keeping the value of GDPG fixed at its sample average value. 17. It should be noted that not all the cyclical component can be taken out of the rating system since a high number of the idiosyncratic variables are influenced by it. A pure acyclical rating system (and the PDs from it) would need all remaining variables to be free of the cycle, which for some cases would suppose the estimation of a complete different model. Capital requirements and procyclicality
Basel II risk parameters (PDs)
In order to measure capital requirements under the IRB approach for mortgages it is necessary to make a hypothesis regarding the loss given default, LGD. Given the supervisory experience acquired from the various Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) carried out by the BCBS in recent years, an LGD fixed at 15% seems to be a reasonable figure.
In any case, as this parameter enters lineally in the Basel II capital requirement formulas, whenever it is set to a certain value its impact will only be a matter of level. Its shape will change over time only if LGDs are also dependent on the business cycle 18 and are calculated using a cycle-sensitive approach. This would provide different LGD values for different periods of time (e.g. downturn LGD estimates). Table 4 , first column, shows the capital requirements associated with a PIT PD. TTC PDs have several important properties, as can be seen in Table 4 , second column. In the first place, much of the dispersion that PIT PDs incorporate disappears.
This is the result of how TTC PDs are calculated. The inclusion of the worst record of the business cycle in the PD equation assures that at the trough of the business cycle the amount of capital will totally cover the losses that the Basel II formulas stipulate at the 99.9%
percentile (i.e. the excess over the expected losses which, in principle, are covered by provisions).
Altman et al. (2005) study the relationship between PDs and
LGDs for corporate bonds.
On the other hand, as the cycle moves towards its most benign part, the most adverse GDP growth rate figure in the PD equation partly compensates for the improvement experienced by the rest of the explanatory variables. This partial balance provokes a lower reduction in capital required and results in a lower associated volatility. Similarly, if the cycle moves into a new recession, the progressive deterioration of the rest of the variables will gradually increase the capital required as prevailing conditions deteriorate with no major variations from one period to the next. It can also be seen that the current capital requirements for the more advanced approaches of Basel II are one percentage point under those arising from the Standardized Approach (1.84% versus 2.8%), and are even less than half of those coming from the current capital regime (4%).
In a similar vein, a PD based on a long-run average (in principle, that proposed by the BCBS to be used as the input for the credit capital requirement formulas) would normally produce similar results to the TTC PD described above. However this measure will never exactly reproduce the requirements needed to cover the unexpected losses at the 99.9% percentile at the trough of the business cycle, simply because of the way it is calculated. On the other hand, the requirements for boom periods will be lower than those obtained from a TTC PD, since the further the distance from the trough the more similar the long-run estimates are to those coming from a PIT PD. This fact translates into a higher variation of capital over the business cycle. The current IRB capital figure that would derive from this method of calculation would be, to some extent, lower than the figure coming from the Standardized Approach (40% lower) and almost 60% less than the current capital regime figure.
Finally, the PDs corrected for the cycle (column 4 in Table 4 ) or those defined as acyclical (column 5 in Table 4 ) produce fairly similar results. It seems that when the variable representing the business cycle is set to its average value over the sample period, the effect on the estimated PDs is similar to the one that would take place when the cycle is obviated.
The variability observed for these approaches is much lower than that in any other possibilities in which PDs can be calculated. However, at the trough of the business cycle these methods are those which seem to be least from adequate to cover the part of the unexpected losses associated with the 99.9% percentile. On the other hand, for the most favourable part of the cycle, the estimated PDs are much more similar to the real ones (PIT ones). As just said, the dispersion of this approach is the lowest. However, the omission of the cycle prevents from covering an important part of the losses that could take place and that could provoke solvency problems in case of severe adverse events.
All the capital figures presented so far have been calculated considering PD averages. However, banks will not use this type of estimates to determine their regulatory capital requirements. Instead, for IRB purposes, banks will be required to employ their own rating systems. These are risk classification devices which discriminate borrowers according to their creditworthiness and, accordingly, assign them into different risk buckets.
Each bucket represents an homogenous credit risk group and is characterized by an associated probability of default which depends crucially on both the nature of the rating system (PIT, TTC, average rating....) and how it is used to calculate the corresponding PD estimate (as described above in terms of average PDs, e.g. PIT, TTC, long-run, corrected for the cycle, ...).
Notwithstanding that, the developing of a meaningful and consistent rating system, including the choice of the optimal number of risk buckets, is beyond the objectives of this paper since that increases complexity significantly without achieving results much different from those commented so far using average PDs regarding the discussion on the issue of procyclicaltiy related to Basel II.
Nevertheless, we tested the robustness of Table 4 results by developing, on the one hand, a tentative PIT rating system 19 , and on the other hand, an extreme case example which considers capital requirements directly calculated from individual obligors' PD estimates.
In this latter case, we calculate the capital figure for the whole mortgage portfolio by adding each borrower's capital requirements weighted by her/his exposure with regard to the total exposure of the entire portfolio. Alternatively, capital requirements from the rating system are calculated by applying the average PD of each risk bucket to the exposure of all obligors that fall in each risk class proportionally to the total exposure of the whole portfolio.
The results obtained show that the capital figure derived from the rating system is similar, although somehow lower, to that obtained by using an average PD, while that calculated for the extreme case of individual PD estimates is much lower 20 (a maximum capital figure of 1.5% in bad times and a minimum of 0.7% in good times). Despite the relatively lower levels of capital requirements for these two cases, recorded variability along the sample period (business cycle), is, as for the above mentioned case regarding sample average PDs, very high.
Since the purpose of this paper is to address and analyse variability and dispersion of capital figures along time depending on the method PDs are computed, the utilisation of sample average PDs to obtain capital requirements, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 2, although simple, seems a reasonable approximation (sufficiently informative) to discuss the procyclicality issue of regulatory capital regarding Basel II.
Discussion on procyclicality
The foregoing sections have shown that capital requirements under Basel II for mortgages significantly change depending on the method used by banks for calculating their credit risk parameters, namely, their PDs. The first lesson to be learned is that variability may be an important caveat as observed in the mortgage portfolio for the entire system and that the reduction in capital figures, considering possible estimates of measures of risk, could rise up to 75% with respect to the current capital regime. The use of PIT PDs is the extreme case, with significant variations across the business cycle.
The second important idea that can be obtained from these results is the wide dispersion that can exist among banks when producing regulatory capital measures regarding Basel II and that may not correspond to real differences in borrowers' risk profiles.
Supervisors must be sure of the accuracy, reliability and application of the inputs that banks may use to determine IRB capital requirements. The previous section contained a very clear illustration of this situation: if capital is calculated using a PIT PD the resulting figure is 45% lower than that obtained if a TTC PD was used (a similar reduction is observed if a long-run average was used instead). This enormous variation in different ways of calculating measures of risk (all of them related, in one way or another, to the prevailing conditions of 19. Such a rating system is based on nine buckets, the last one for defaulted loans, showing an exponentially growing PD while exposures across buckets follows a normal distribution, which are the two basic hypotheses underlying any rating system. 20. The reason for this reduction in capital lies in the concavity of the IRB capital functions.
the economic cycle) must pose the question of which of them, if any, should be the most appropriate to determine capital figures.
PIT PDs have important properties and are basically those that banks work with when applying their scoring/rating systems either for pricing or making the decision whether or not to grant a loan to a possible customer. Additionally, they allow for cross comparison among banks of their credit risk profiles and, as a result, produce accurate and homogenous assessments of the risk incurred by each bank. However, it seems highly unlikely that supervisors will be prepared to accept such a measure for computing capital, because of the high variability that it contains which is reflected in capital requirements under the Basel II formulas.
Several options are open to try to work out this caveat: for example, those TTC PDs may not be the answer to the previous question either, since the level of requirements is quite above any other measure, especially for the benign part of the business cycle. Banks could be asked for a high level of capital when clearly it is not required given the level of actual risk. However, this measure assures that at the trough of the business cycle, losses will be covered (under the Basel II framework) with a 99.9% probability.
A trade-off comes up in this situation: enjoying a high probability of covering losses when most needed, as against requiring banks to maintain a buffer of excess of capital over their real needs.
Although counterintuitive, this type of risk measure also discriminates between the degree of risk each bank incurs. PIT PDs reflect both current economic and obligor-specific conditions whereas TTC ones only reflect the latter as all banks share in the PD equation the same value for the cycle variable (the most adverse one in the sample period). Nevertheless, in terms of creditworthiness, both measures incorporate valid information to classify obligors with respect to the inherent risk that their profile presupposes.
Finally, it is also important to take into account the asymmetry in requirements that this measure produces. As said before, by using a TTC PD, supervisors can be sure that for a recession period, capital required will be in line with the real needs that the economic situation implies. On the other hand, the misallocation of capital only comes during upturns. This could be considered as a price for a lower level of volatility in capital figures anticipating possible future bad times, when raising capital could be much harder to obtain (and in any case, far more expensive) than maintaining a higher amount in good times.
Long-run averages share most of the properties of TTC PDs as commented above.
Based on the particular way they are constructed, they are less demanding for banks since for upturns they will be more similar to PIT PDs and, consequently, the capital figures will be much lower than those calculated using TTC PDs. Their main drawback arises in downturns when the amount of capital will not assure with a 99.9% probability that losses will be covered. From a supervisory perspective long-run averages fall short of the most important advantage of TTC PDs without significantly improving its main caveat.
Other things being equal, TTC PDs, as presented in this paper, seem superior to long-run averages.
In for the last twenty years (i.e. almost two business cycles).
We estimate a probability of default model for mortgages, using information of roughly 3 million borrowers. This model includes several risk profile variables (liquidity constraints and default and delinquency past history of each borrower) and a macro variable (GDP growth rate) and allows us to assign to each individual a single probability of default.
Based on these probabilities and on different approaches, depending on the nature of the measure to be calculated, we obtain distinct averages that allow us to study their properties and adequacy for regulatory capital.
In short, we compare point-in-time, through-the-cycle, long-run averages, cyclically corrected, and acyclical PDs. The comparison of these approximations to measure credit risk, provides us with evidence which translates into a highly significant variability, in particular of point-in-time PDs, along the cycle with huge changes in capital requirements from peak (expansion) to trough (recession). That variability raises a concern for supervisors who aim to apply the more advanced approaches included in Basel II.
Through-the-cycle measures show much less variability, although the average level of capital requirements is relatively high. Acyclical ratings produce stable and relatively low requirements. Thus, a reasonable compromise might be the use of TTC ratings, but not using the worst point in the cycle to compute them. An alternative compromise might well be the use of acyclical PD measures which share most of their properties with TTC PDs with the advantage of being more benign, in terms of required capital, during upturns. However, attention should be paid in the way the cyclical effect is taken out when estimating those PDs.
All in all, we show that Basel II procyclicality is an open issue that deserves careful scrutiny for mortgage portfolios and, by extension, for corporate and retail ones. In any case, the Basel II framework has within itself the mechanism to deal with this issue (i.e. rating system properties and supervisory implementation).
TAYLOR, A., and C. GOODHART (2004 of correctly classified defaulted borrowers (combination of the columns headed "observed defaults" and "predicted defaults"). It is also provided the proportion of correctly classified non-defaulted borrowers (combination of the columns headed "observed non-defaults"
and "predicted non-defaults") and implicitly the ratio of correctly classified borrowers by the regression model (sum of the combination of the columns headed "observed defaults" and "predicted defaults" and the combination of the columns headed "observed non-defaults"
and "predicted non-defaults" over the total number of borrowers). It is also shown the ROC curve value and the Accuracy Ratio. Area under ROC curve = 0.78.
Accuracy ratio = 57%. 
